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Recent years have seen a dramatic shift from mutual funds into hedge funds even though hedge 
funds charge management fees that have been decried as outrageous. While expectations of 
superior returns may be responsible for this shift, this article shows that mutual funds are more 
expensive than commonly believed. Mutual funds appear to provide investment services for 
relatively low fees because they bundle passive and active funds management together in a way 
that understates the true cost of active management. In particular, funds engaging in “closet” or 
“shadow” indexing charge their investors for active management while providing them with little 
more than an indexed investment. Even the average mutual fund, which ostensibly provides only 
active management, will have over 90% of the variance in its returns explained by its benchmark 
index. This article derives a method for allocating fund expenses between active and passive 
management and constructs a simple formula for finding the cost of active management. 
Computing this “active expense ratio” requires only a fund’s published expense ratio, its  
R-squared relative to a benchmark index, and the expense ratio for a competitive fund that tracks 
that index. At the end of 2004, the mean active expense ratio for the large-cap equity mutual 
funds tracked by Morningstar was 7%, over six times their published expense ratio of 1.15%. 
More broadly, funds in the Morningstar universe had a mean active expense ratio of 5.2%, while 
the largest funds averaged a percent or two less.    
During the last twenty years, an era marked by the rise of both index funds and hedge funds, 
investors of all stripes have gazed with increasing skepticism toward investment managers. As 
soon as it became practical for investors to “own” stock indexes, these bogeys went from 
benchmarks of largely theoretical interest to viable investment vehicles. Then, the introduction of 
style analysis by William Sharpe and others and its popularization in a simplified form by 
Morningstar fundamentally changed the way that the performance of traditional money managers 
was assessed. Either by a count of rating stars or through the use of more sophisticated measures, 
managers were given credit only for performance that they were determined to have actively 
earned. Sharpe (1992) would show that 97.3% of the variance in returns of what was then the 
mutual fund with the most assets under management, Fidelity’s Magellan Fund, could be 
attributed to “passive” style choices, with only the remaining 2.7% of variance attributed to the 
“active” selections of its manager. 
 
In the years since Sharpe’s analysis of Magellan first appeared, the fund’s portfolio has become 
more passive as its steady drift into large capitalization U.S. stocks continued. Indeed, 
Morningstar reported at the end of 2004 that 99% of the variance in Magellan’s returns could be 
traced to a single index, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500). 
Between 1992 and 2004, Magellan’s expense ratio fell by a full third—from 1.05% of assets 
under management to 0.70%—however, when compared with the alternative of paying 18 basis 
points for Vanguard’s S&P 500 Index Fund or (more recently) 10 basis points for Fidelity’s 
comparable index fund, 70 basis points cannot be considered a bargain. Magellan was not alone; 
many mutual funds have engaged to one degree or another in “closet” or “shadow” indexing—
charging their investors for active management while providing them with little more than an 
indexed investment. 
 
This article develops a method for uncovering the true costs and benefits of active fund 
management. While analysts have typically focused on how the portfolio’s variance is allocated 
among its investments, the techniques developed here look at the allocation of the implied shares 
of funds being passively and actively managed.
1 In essence, we take the portfolio and decompose 
it into a purely passive component, which is equivalent to an investment in one or more index 
funds, and a purely active component, which is equivalent to an investment in a portfolio that is 
uncorrelated with the index. From this decomposition we can estimate the true cost of 
management for the active component of the fund.
2 By isolating this active component, we can 
also adjust the portfolio’s performance measures, such as alpha, to remove any dilution caused 
by the passive component. 
 
                                                 
1 Swedroe (2001, pp. 68–69) constructs an example that uses a variance decomposition to compute directly the 
passive and active shares of funds under management. This approach tends to overestimate the implied expense ratio 
for the active component because it generates passive and active shares that are inconsistent with a proper 
replicating portfolio. 
2 An alternative to the decomposition method presented here is the overlay method proposed by Asness (2004a and 
2004b). Although the overlay method provides another strong argument for the proposition that the cost of active 
management is greater than a fund’s overall expense ratio, it only allows one to compute this cost in the special case 
where the beta of the fund relative to the benchmark is unity. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  2 
  
Consider, for purposes of illustration, the Fidelity Magellan Fund at the end of 2004. Based on 
monthly data from the preceding three years, an investor could have replicated the risk and return 
characteristics of the fund (including its R
2 of 99%) by placing 90.87% of his or her assets in an 
index fund that tracks the S&P 500 and the remaining 9.13% in an appropriately chosen market-
neutral investment. In this new portfolio, 99% of the variance of this portfolio is explained by the 
index and we can leverage it in a way that Magellan’s beta and variance are also replicated.  If 
we then take 18 basis points as the expense ratio for the passive component of Magellan (the 
same ratio as the version of Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund marketed to individual investors), 
Magellan might be seen as “overcharging” investors by 52 basis points on the passive component 
of its portfolio. If we were to assess those 52 basis points against the 9.13% of the portfolio that 
is actively managed, we would find that annual expenses account for 5.87% of those funds. 
 
The 5.87% annual cost of the active management implicitly provided by Magellan’s 
management, which we will call its active expense ratio, could be justified on economic grounds 
if the fund provided superior returns to its investors. For purposes of comparison, a hedge fund 
that charges the standard annual fee of  2% of funds under management plus 20% of its positive 
returns would have to earn 19.35% on the actively managed assets (and provide investors with a 
net return of 15.48%) in order to earn a total of 5.87%.
3 Unfortunately, not only did Magellan 
fail to post that performance on the active portion of its portfolio, it managed to lose substantially 
more than that on an annual basis over the three years from 2002 through 2004. When 
Magellan’s alpha of –2.67% per year over that period is allocated solely to the active component 
of its portfolio, it has an active alpha
4 of –27.45%. 
 
While Magellan performed worse than the average mutual fund did between 2002 and 2004, its 
active expense ratio was in line with the mean of both large-cap mutual funds and the broader 
universe of mutual funds. The average mutual fund achieves an active expense ratio in the range 
of 5% to 7% that is consistent with an overall expense ratio of about 1.25% and a passive 
component that explains at least 90% of the variance in its returns. Like overall expense ratios, 
active expense ratios tended to be lower on average for the very largest funds. 
 
The active expense ratio has the virtue of providing a meaningful measure of true cost of active 
management in a single number. This measure can be readily applied not just to mutual funds, 
but to most investments that have a passive component to them. All that is required to perform a 
virtual decomposition of a fund’s assets into a passive component and an active component is a 
fund’s R
2 (explained variance) relative to one or more market indexes. Both the active expense 
                                                 
3 Any direct comparison of fees between hedge funds and mutual funds is complicated by the fact that hedge fund 
expenses are structured to include a sizeable incentive component. Many mutual funds, including Fidelity Magellan 
Fund, have provisions that link fees to performance; however, these incentive payments are typically small relative 
to the standard for hedge funds. This difference in incentive structures might also be expected to induce managers 
who were more confident of outperforming the market to work for hedge funds. Mutual fund expenses can include 
fees that are not technically management fees. Both hedge funds and mutual funds do not include commissions and 
other trading-related expenses in their fees; however, these are reflected in fund performance. 
4 This use of the term “active alpha” is distinct from that used by Litterman (2003) to refer to a specific portfolio 
strategy. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  3 
  
ratio and active alpha (from a single index) can then be computed directly from data available for 
free over the Internet from services such as Morningstar and finance portals such as Yahoo! 
Finance. 
 
This approach to portfolio decomposition was inspired by the financial engineering approach to 
asset management that has its roots in the Black-Scholes-Merton model and that has recently 
influenced the growing use of “portable alpha” strategies (see Arnott, 2002; Litterman, 2003; and 
Kung and Pohlman, 2004). While the decomposition employed here is quite different from that 
used to price options, it shares with option pricing models the important feature that beta literally 
does not enter into the equation. Thus, a fund manager’s decision about how much leverage to 
employ—either directly through borrowing or indirectly by choosing to hold more highly levered 
assets—should be viewed as independent of the manager’s allocation (either intentional or 
unintentional) between passive and active management. 
 
Portable alpha enters the picture because it encapsulates the idea that passive and active risk 
from different asset classes can be “mixed and matched.” For example, if an investor believes 
that outperformance is too expensive or difficult to achieve in the equity market, he might find it 
worthwhile to replace his traditional equity investments with a combination of a passive 
investment in an equity index fund and an active investment in real estate. In this way he can 
“port” relatively cheap alpha in real estate over to equity. The idea of decoupling the acquisition 
of alpha from the asset allocation decision launched if not a thousand hedge funds, at least a few 
hundred of them. 
 
A mutual fund investor can view himself as a captive holder of an active portfolio that could, in 
principle, be swapped for another, more suitable, active portfolio. By isolating the active element 
of any traditional investment, not just equity mutual funds but in any type of security where 
indexing is possible, its costs and performance can be more directly compared with other active 
investments in either bundled or unbundled form.  Performance considerations aside, when one 
looks at the active management provided by market-neutral or other predominantly active hedge 
funds in a world with inexpensive passive alternatives, their supposedly outrageous fees are not 




This article begins by deriving the formulas for computing the implied share of assets under 
active management, which in turn allow us to compute the active expense ratio and active alpha. 
These measures are then applied to a class of assets that best illustrates the power of this 
method—large-cap stock mutual funds. Large-cap funds have a single, natural benchmark, which 
is the S&P 500. We divide large-cap funds into two groups for the purpose of this analysis, those 
aimed at individuals and those that target institutional investors. The article concludes with an 
examination of how the techniques developed in this article can be extended. 
 
                                                 
5 In an August 2001 article critical of hedge funds, Fortune magazine (Clash, Lenzner and Maiello, 2001) repeatedly 
characterize hedge fund fees as “outrageous.”  Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  4 
  
Deriving the Active Expense Ratio and Active Alpha 
 
A fund’s reported R
2 relative to one or more passive investment alternatives does not directly 
give us the share of funds being passively managed; rather, it gives the share of variance in 
returns that can be explained by these investments. If we are able to model explicitly the sources 
of variance in the portfolio, then we can derive a formula for the active share of funds. In turn, 
this share can be used to derive formulas for the active expense ratio and active alpha. 
 
Ideally, we would like to isolate the active component of a fund’s portfolio by dividing its assets 
into two disjoint parts such that the passive part was perfectly correlated with the benchmark 
index and the active part was entirely uncorrelated with it. Having done this we could find the 
expense ratio for the active part by noting that fund’s expenses can be written as following 
weighted sum: 
 
A A I A P C w C w C + − = ) 1 (     (1) 
 
where CP is the portfolio expense ratio for portfolio P, CI is the passive expense ratio, CA is the 
active expense ratio, and wA is the proportion of the portfolio being actively managed.  
 
The passive expense ratio, CI, is taken to be the expense ratio for a competitive index fund that is 
used as the benchmark. While judgment must be exercised to place a value on CI, the 
computations that use it are relatively insensitive to its value. CI is currently 50 basis points or 
less per annum for all but the most obscure or difficult to match indexes. Expense ratios can be 
nearly zero for institutional purchases of the most popular indexes and are about 20 basis points 
for the other major indexes. For all but a tiny proportion of funds that have their expenses 
subsidized, CP for a fund is substantially greater than its corresponding CI.  
 








+ = ,     (2) 
 
with 1 0 ≤ < A w . The active weight of the portfolio,  A w , will only be zero when the portfolio’s 
returns correlate perfectly with those of the index and then CA will be undefined. In the usual 
case where  , I P C C >  the active expense ratio can be seen to exceed the expense ratio for both 
the index and the portfolio. 
 
As noted above, we can compute CA directly if we can find a partition of the portfolio into 
distinct passive and active parts. In that case, wA is simply the proportion of assets invested in the 
active part. Unfortunately, such a clear-cut separation of assets is virtually impossible to achieve 
in practice. Generally, most of a fund’s holdings will contribute to both active and passive 
elements to the portfolio in a fundamentally inseparable way. 
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One could use this holographic nature of the active and passive elements of the typical portfolio 
to argue that it is inadvisable to penalize a manager for holding the passive component of his 
portfolio because it came along for the ride with the active component. Indeed, the portfolio 
manager could be seen as merely passing along the passive component that is already bundled 
into the assets he acquires and, moreover, any diversification required to make the portfolio more 
efficient will legitimately increase the passive component.  
 
This argument can be addressed in three ways. First, it simply reinforces the larger point that 
active management does not come cheaply. Desirable active positions are rarely the found 
objects of the marketplace; instead, they must be refined out of the raw material available to 
asset managers and the refining process costs money. Second, it is reasonable to believe that 
some managers take on positions that are more passive than necessary to establish their active 
positions. Some techniques for “gaming the benchmark” can lead to taking a more passive 
posture than investors might desire. Third, and finally, the economics of the situation dictate that 
the true economic cost of anything, including portfolio management services, is determined by 
the cost of the best available alternatives. If traditional active managers find themselves in the 
position of being inefficient providers of active asset management for any reason, they will either 
adapt or eventually be forced out of business. 
 
The inability to divide a fund’s portfolio literally into a passive and an active part; however, does 
not mean that one cannot derive a decomposition that achieves the desired separation. In fact, we 
do not need to define the decomposition on an asset-by-asset basis. Instead, we need only 
ascertain the statistical properties that this decomposition must satisfy. Considering that few 
mutual funds provide timely information on their holdings, this is a desirable property. From a 
single assumption about how variance is distributed throughout the fund’s portfolio, we can 
specify the properties of the decomposition without knowing the fund’s holdings. The only 
information that is necessary is the R
2 from the regression of the fund’s returns against those of 
the index, which is equal to the proportion of the variance in returns explained by the index. 
 
The standard linear regression equation for portfolio returns can be written as: 
 
, P I P P P r r ε β α + + =      (3) 
 
where  P r  is the return of the portfolio and  I r  is the return of the index. (The letter I is used as the 
subscript here rather than the more standard M  because we do not wish to imply that the index 
represents the “market” as a whole.) Equation (3) is commonly estimated by commercial services 
using monthly returns over a period of three to five years. If the returns are taken to be the 
returns in excess of the risk-free rate of return
6, which we will assume they are, then beta ( P β ) is 
the amount of index-related risk contained in the portfolio and alpha ( P α ), also known as 
Jensen’s alpha, is an index-adjusted measure of the portfolio’s performance. Lastly,  P ε  is the 
                                                 
6 Although excess returns are used throughout this article for consistency with the Morningstar data and standard 
practice, the analysis can also provide a useful decomposition if only gross returns are considered. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  6 
  
residual return, the return not explained by the index that is usually taken to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and a constant variance. A standard property of least-squares 
regression makes the residual returns uncorrelated with the returns of the index. To reduce 
notational overhead, whenever we use  , , P P β α and  P ε  in the remainder of this article, we will be 
referring to the regression estimates of these parameters. 
 
The usual caveats for linear regressions apply here. In particular, regressions involving asset 
returns assume that a portfolio with constant risk/return characteristics (i.e., constant regression 
parameters) is being analyzed over the entire period. While this is an innocuous assumption for 
most funds, it precludes the possibility of substantial shifts in portfolio make-up that could result 
from a fund manager who practices market timing or asset rotation.
7 Furthermore, since the past 
statistical properties of the fund are intended to be used to make decisions about ownership of the 
fund, the risk profile of the fund during the estimation period should carry over into the present 
and, one should hope, into the immediate future. 
 
With those caveats in mind, we can convert equation (3) into a variance decomposition equation 
by taking the variance of both sides of it while taking into account that alpha and beta are 
constants and that the covariance between  I r  and  P ε is zero to get: 
 
) (
2 2 2 2
P I P P ε σ σ β σ + =      (4) 
 
Equation (4) has the effect of decomposing the portfolio variance, 
2
P σ , into two parts. The first 
part, ,
2 2
I Pσ β  is the variance explained by the index. The R
2 for the regression equation (3) is, by 
definition, the variance explained by the index divided by the overall portfolio variance. The 
second part, ), (
2
P ε σ  is the variance not explained by the index, i.e., the residual variance. The 
residual variance divided by the overall portfolio variance is then seen to be 1–R
2. 
 
The index component can be considered purely passive because it could be achieved by investing 
in the index and leveraging or deleveraging that investment as indicated by beta. The residual 
component, on the other hand, represents the largest amount of the variance that can be attributed 
to the active participation of the fund manager. One possible source of variance that cannot be 
attributed to the actions of the manager is the “noise” associated with the inability of the manager 
to diversify away fully those elements of idiosyncratic risk that are tied to the manager’s active 
bets. In large portfolios, this “noise” is likely to be small and we will give the manager the 
benefit of the doubt that entire residual term comes from active management.
8 
 
                                                 
7 Dybvig and Ross (1985) and Dybvig (2003) explore the limitations of static performance measures when applied 
to a dynamic setting such as a fund manager who engages in information-based asset selection strategies. 
8 This assumption tends to make the estimate of the active expense ratio a conservative one. Later, we discuss a way 
to relax it. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  7 
  
The coefficient  P β  in regression equation (3) captures the degree of influence that the index has 
on the portfolio. This becomes 
2
P β  when expressed in terms of variance. The influence of the 
active component, however, is not separated out—there is no coefficient for the “active 
portfolio” in equation (3), just the residual term,  P ε . 
 
To achieve the desired separation between the passive and active components of portfolio P, we 
will imagine what such a decomposition would entail if it were possible. We start by assuming 
that the only things that we know about the portfolio are the index (I ) used to estimate regression 
(3), the estimated coefficients in that regression, and its R
2. We will assume that we do not know 
the actual holdings in the portfolio. 
 
Now consider how we might construct a synthetic portfolio P´ that has the same risk and return 
characteristics (alpha, beta, variance and its decomposition, etc.) as portfolio P but with a clear 
separation between the assets invested in its passive and active parts. We will construct the 
passive part of P´, which we will call I´, so that it is a leveraged version of the index I. This 
passive component, which is known as the fund’s tracking portfolio, is nothing more than a 
portfolio that holds the index and either levers it down by holding excess cash or levers it up 
using borrowed funds or index futures. On the other hand, the active component, which we will 
call A´, is not constructed directly; instead, its properties are inferred from those of the fund’s 
portfolio. Knowing these properties, we can determine the costs that should be allocated to the 
active component (the fund’s active expense ratio) and the excess returns associated with it (the 
fund’s active alpha). 
 
Recall that wA is the proportion of the portfolio P that we are taking to be actively managed, so 
the returns of the portfolio P´ can be written as the weighted sum of its passive return  I r ′  and of 
its active return A r ′  as follows: 
 
A A I A P r w r w r ′ ′ ′ + − = ) 1 (    (5) 
 













Therefore, the leverage factor for the passive component I´ is  ) 1 ( A P w − β . A typical value for 
this leverage factor in the Morningstar universe is 1.15, so for the purposes of this analysis it is 
reasonable to assume that the cost of achieving this leverage is sufficiently small that it can be 
safely ignored. Note that whenever the original portfolio’s beta is greater than one that there will 
never be a way to replicate it without employing leverage, so this decomposition will not 
necessarily “conserve assets.” 
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By construction, the returns of the active component of the portfolio (rA´) are uncorrelated with 
those of the passive component (rI´). Taking this into account to compute the variance from (5) 
we get: 
 




I′ σ  is the passive variance and 
2
A′ σ  is the active variance. Since we want the proportion of 
variance explained by the passive and active components to be the same for P´ as it was for P, 














,      ( 7 a )  
 













.      ( 7 b )  
 
If we divide each side of (7b) by the corresponding side of (7a), the variance 
2



















     (8) 
 
Equation (8) then implicitly gives the value of wA in terms of R
2 and the ratio of the active to the 
passive variance, which is 
2 2
I A ′ ′ σ σ . We have assumed that we know the value of R
2; however, it 
will take one additional assumption about the portfolio in order to pin down 
2 2
I A ′ ′ σ σ . 
 
In the absence of any information about the portfolio beyond R
2 and the estimated coefficients of 
the regression equation, the natural assumption to make is that the active and passive 
components have the same variance, so that  1
2 2 = ′ ′ I A σ σ . This assumption can be viewed as 
equivalent to assuming that the leverage attributable to the passive side of the portfolio, as 
reflected by  P β , carries over to the active side. Because factor model studies such as Fama and 
French (1992) have stripped the standard beta of any special significance, it is reasonable to 
believe that in a single factor model it serves as something like a proxy for leverage or firm size 
and, as such, should apply uniformly throughout the portfolio. The effects of relaxing or 
changing this assumption are discussed at the end of this article. 
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If we then substitute  1
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Having solved for the weight, we now go to back and substitute into equation (2) to compute the 












+ = .    (11) 
 
Notice that equation (11) allows us to derive the active expense ratio knowing only 
2 R and the 
expense ratios for the portfolio and the index. The active expense ratio increases with both an 
increase in the fund’s expense ratio and its 
2 R  relative to the index. When the cost of indexing 
rises, the active expense ratio will decline as a larger proportion of the fund’s costs are consumed 
by passive management. Beta, as noted above, does not enter at all into the calculation of the 
active expense ratio. 
 
The alpha of the active component is computed in a similar manner. The following equation 
gives the portfolio alpha,  , P α as a weighted sum of the active alpha,  , A α and the passive alpha, 
which we will assume to be the negative of the cost of indexing, CI :
9 
 
I A A A P C w w ) 1 ( − − = α α     (12) 
 











α α     (13) 
 
                                                 
9 This may tend to underestimate alpha for many of the larger index funds because they tend to employ successful 
enhancement strategies that recoup some fraction of their expenses. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  10 
  
All other things being equal, an increase in the portfolio’s alpha raises the alpha of the active part 
as one would expect. As the active share of the portfolio declines (with an increase in R
2), active 
alpha becomes more sensitive to changes in the portfolio’s alpha. Finally, the more that the 
implicit cost of indexing reduces the portfolio’s alpha, the greater active alpha becomes. 
 
 
Applying the Formulas to Large-Cap and Other Mutual Funds 
 
Having developed the machinery for isolating the active component of the typical mutual fund’s 
portfolio from publicly available data, we will now look at values of the active expense ratio and 
active alpha computed from the January 2005 annual release of the Morningstar mutual fund 
database. This database contains comprehensive information on 17,411 funds through December 
31, 2004. Morningstar computes its regression-based measurements for funds—alpha, beta, and 
R
2—from monthly excess returns over the previous 36 months. Fund expense ratios in the 
Morningstar database constitute the most recently reported figures.
10 
 
Morningstar categorizes funds in three ways—using its own style system, using the objective 
stated in each fund’s prospectus, and using the benchmark which provides the best fit to the 
fund’s returns as measured by R
2. In this study the prospectus objective was not used because of 
its subjective, and potentially misleading, nature. 
 
Given our focus on active management, the first step was to prune the database by eliminating 
any fund that was either explicitly identified as an index fund or that had an R
2 of 100% relative 
to its best-fit index.
11 Since Morningstar rounds R
2 to the nearest percentage point, funds with a 
stated R
2 of 100% can include funds whose actual R
2 was as low as 99.5%.
12 While this screen 
may have eliminated the most egregious closet indexers from the sample, it mainly excludes 
index funds that were not flagged as such. Also removed from the sample were funds reporting 
less than $10 million of assets under management. Such small funds were more likely to have 
anomalous expense structures either because they had too few assets over which to allocate 
expenses or because they were new funds whose expenses were being temporarily subsidized. 
 
                                                 
10 Actual expenses over the previous 36 months are not reported. Given the general stability of expense ratios, it 
seems safe to assume for the purposes of this analysis that the reported expense ratio is representative of the entire 
36-month period. 
11 Note that any fund that was not in existence during the entire three-year period was automatically excluded from 
this study because R
2  would not be available for it. Because the vast majority of money invested in mutual funds is 
in established funds, any survivorship bias is not considered to be a significant issue here. 
12 Rounding error is greater for mutual funds with higher values of R
2.
 In the absence of evidence that fund managers 
systematically game the value of 
 R
2 in either direction, there is no reason to adjust these values. A more 
conservative measure when singling out a single fund would involve subtracting 0.5% from it; however, the results 
when averaged over many funds can be expected to be more accurate if the published figures for R
2 are used and so 
that is the approach taken here. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  11 
  
The sample was not strictly restricted to no-load funds; however, funds with either a front-end or 
back-end load of greater than 1% were excluded.
13 Funds with expense ratios of 30 basis points 
or less, which constituted about 1% of the sample, were also excluded. The only equity funds 
that were affected were those whose investors were limited to employees of the fund manager’s 
company, such as GE’s S&S Program and Elfun funds. (Funds with broader target audiences 
such as AARP and TIAA-CREF were retained in the sample because their fees were not deemed 
low enough to raise a red flag.)  As noted above, funds with sufficiently low expense ratios 
usually have their expenses subsidized in some manner.  
 
Finally, funds classified by Morningstar as either “Moderate Allocation” or “Conservative 
Allocation” were dropped from the sample. These funds were considered more likely to have 
market timing and asset rotation issues that would affect their active expense ratio, active alpha, 
and overall alpha. After all screening was completed, 4,752 of the 17,411 original funds 
remained. 
 
An examination of how well Morningstar’s categorization scheme matched up against their 
reported “best-fit index,” the index with which the fund had the highest R
2, led to the conclusion 
that large-cap U.S. equity funds had the least ambiguous benchmark—the S&P 500 Index. 
Choosing the “wrong” benchmark index can create two kinds of problems. First, it can reduce 
the estimated share of the fund under active management (which also reduces its active expense 
ratio) since the R
2 relative to that index will tend to understate the fund’s passivity. Second, the 
estimated value of alpha that is used as the primary input into the estimate of the fund’s active 
alpha will be misspecified.  
 
Only funds that Morningstar placed in one of its three large-cap style categories—Large Blend, 
Large Value, and Large Growth—were included in the sample of 152 large-cap funds. This 
eliminated “bear” funds that provide investors with returns that are negatively correlated with the 
S&P 500 and a few other funds with correlations that appeared spurious. The large-cap funds 
were then divided into two groups—individual and institutional. Funds were considered 
institutional when they had a minimum initial investment requirement of $100,000 or more—a 
dividing line that basically agrees with the data provided by Morningstar and deals with the few 
cases where a fund’s name and its Morningstar designation do not match. Funds requiring less 
than a $100,000 initial investment were taken to be individual funds. Under this criterion, there 
were 36 institutional funds and 116 individual funds. The two groups were treated identically 
except that the 0.18% expense ratio for Vanguard’s S&P 500 Index Fund was assigned as the 
                                                 
13 The expense ratio for funds with small loads was not adjusted to include the load. The lack of an unbiased method 
to adjust expense ratios for loads led to the exclusion of funds with significant loads from the sample. This is less of 
a problem for funds with multiple classes since one of the classes (Class C) normally has little or no load and so can 
represent the fund in the sample; however, the other classes may provide lower expenses for some long-term 
investors. The 1% cutoff was deliberately selected so that Class C shares would be included. No effort was made to 
add this load back into the fund’s expenses—it was simply ignored for the purposes of this study. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  12 
  
cost of indexing for the individual funds and the 0.05% expense ratio for Vanguard’s 
Institutional S&P 500 Index Fund was used for the institutional funds.
14 
 
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the 152 large-cap funds as well as the broader universe of 
4,752 funds from which they were drawn. The computed values for the active expense ratio and 
active alpha for the Morningstar universe are presented to establish rough baseline figures for 
comparative purposes only. To avoid the problem of finding an appropriate benchmark index as 
well as a cost of indexing for each fund, a constant indexing cost of 0.30% was assumed for each 
fund.
15 The active expense ratio for each fund was computed using equation (11) and active 
alpha was computed using equation (13).  
 
As one would expect, institutional large-cap funds have lower average expense ratios than 
individual funds. They also have lower active expense ratios even though their mean R
2 of 
96.86% is nearly a full percentage point above that of the individual funds. (It is interesting that 
the mean R
2 for both institutional and individual funds exceeds the 95% threshold that Bogle 
(1999) and others view as a signal of closet indexing.) With so much of the variance of 
institutional funds being explained by the S&P 500, it is not surprising that their average active 
expense ratio of 5.14% runs more than 500% higher than the published expense ratio of 0.77%. 
 
Over the entire sample of 152 large-cap funds, the mean active expense ratio is just under 7% per 
year. To beat the cost of a purely actively hedge fund that takes an annual 2% off the top and 
20% of all positive returns, the manager of the average fund would have to generate a gross 
active return of 25%.
16  
 
In the broader sample of 4,752 funds, the mean active expense ratio of 5.20% is only a bit more 
than the mean for institutional large-cap funds. The overall expense ratio, 1.26%, is the same as 
that for individual large-cap funds. The broader sample offsets its higher expenses with what is 
apparently more active management—the mean best-fit R
2 is 90.24%. 
 
The performance of the large-cap funds in the sample as measured both by the standard overall 
alpha and by active alpha is undistinguished on average. Institutional funds only perform slightly 
better than individual funds and the mean overall alpha of –1.50% plummets to a mean of  
–9.01% for active alpha. In essence, large-cap funds taken as a whole consume 7% of the assets 
being actively managed as expenses and then generate another 2% of losses beyond that.
                                                 
14 Although Vanguard’s institutional version of its index fund requires an initial investment of $10,000,000, it was 
assumed that this would not pose a problem to the typical institutional investor. For investors who are able to post a 
$25,000,000 initial investment, Vanguard has an institutional S&P 500 index fund with only a 2.5 basis point fee. 
15 The mean values for active share, active expense ratio, and active alpha for the Morningstar universe were 
computed using a cost of indexing of 30 basis points for all funds, including those funds for which a more precise 
number would be used when they were analyzed within one of the subsets of funds, for example, the large-cap 
equity funds. 
16 During the 2002-2004 period, the risk-free rate was largely restricted to a range between 1% and 2%, so the total 







Table 1. Properties of the Large-Cap Mutual Fund Samples and the Morningstar Universe of Funds
Net Active
Funds in Assets in Share Overall Active Overall Active
Category Sample $ million w A C P C A α P α A
Institutional Large-Cap Funds 36            334.23     96.86 14.52 0.77 5.14 -1.34 -7.71
Individual Large-Cap Funds 116          1,615.22 95.91 15.87 1.26 7.57 -1.55 -9.42
All Large-Cap Funds 152          1,311.83 96.14 15.55 1.15 6.99 -1.50 -9.01
Morningstar Reference Universe 4,752       509.71     90.24 22.05 1.26 5.20 -0.59 -3.19
Note: R
2, Active Shares, Expense Ratios, and Alphas are given in percent (%)
Source: Morningstar.  All data covers the 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004 
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It should be noted that large-cap funds vary greatly in their active expense ratios and active 
alphas. Table 2 provides these numbers as well as the overall measures of cost and performance 
for each of the 36 institutional large-cap funds in the sample, ordered from the lowest active 
expense ratio (GE Institutional US Equity at 2.61%) to the highest (PIMCO StocksPlus 
Administrative at 9.36%). Most of these funds engage in “tilt” or “enhanced index” strategies in 
which they provide their institutional clients with a large-cap portfolio designed to track the S&P 
500 Index while aiming to provide superior performance through the targeting of stocks and 
sectors or through the use of derivatives to enhance returns.
17  
 
Among the funds with the best alphas were those sufficiently tilted toward value stocks to 
warrant a “Large Value” style designation from Morningstar while among those with the worst 
alphas were funds tilted toward growth stocks with a “Large Growth” style designation. (During 
the three-year sample period, value stocks outperformed growth stocks in absolute terms by a 
wide margin.) The only S&P index tracked by Morningstar other than the S&P 500 is the S&P 
MidCap 400, so neither the S&P/Barra 500 Value nor the S&P/Barra 500 Growth indexes are 
included in the possible best-fit indexes. Instead, the Russell 1000 Value and Russell 1000 
Growth indexes, which include many mid-cap stocks, are used. As noted earlier, failure to use 
the appropriate index or combination of indexes will tend to understate the active expense ratio. 
 
Tables 3 and 4, which give cost and performance figures for the ten funds with the lowest active 
expensive ratios and the highest active ratios, respectively, indicate that the range of active 
expense ratios for large-cap funds geared toward individual investors is much wider than their 
institutional brethren. The lowest active expense ratios for individual funds are only somewhat 
higher than the ratios of low-cost institutional funds; however, the high-end of the individual 
funds is much higher than the most expensive institutional funds. The individual funds with the 
greatest active expense ratios are dominated by the Class C shares of funds with high expense 
ratios and R
2s. The individual funds with the lowest active expense ratios in Table 3 are evenly 
divided between outperformers and underperformers, while those with the highest active expense 
ratios in Table 4 are dominated by underperformers. 
 
For institutional large-cap funds, assets are evenly distributed across the expense spectrum. With 
individual funds, however, assets tend to concentrate in funds with low expenses as measured by 
both the overall expense ratio and the active expense ratio.  
 
Table 5 gives the ten individual large-cap funds in the sample with the most assets under 
management at the end of 2004. While their stated overall expense ratios are consistently low—
all are less than 1%—three of the funds (Fidelity Magellan and two versions of Scudder Growth 
& Income) have active expense ratios over 5%. Performance of the larger funds is unexceptional 
as measured by either overall alpha or active alpha, with only the two funds that are in the 
Morningstar “Large Value” category, Fidelity Equity-Income II and American Century Income 
& Growth, possessing positive alphas. 
                                                 
17 Arnott (2002) describes how PIMCO StocksPlus leverages the parent company’s fixed-income expertise to 
implement a portable alpha strategy within that fund to enhance the returns of the S&P 500. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  15 
  
Table 2. All 36 Institutional Large-Cap Mutual Funds
Net
Ticker Morningstar Active Overall Active Overall Assets in
Fund Name Symbol Category CA CP α A α P $ million
GE Instl US Equity Inv GUSIX Large Blend 2.61 0.37 -5.33 -0.71 417.8        98
GE Instl Value Eqty Inv GEIVX Large Blend 2.93 0.41 6.75 0.80 120.3        98
ABN AMRO/Montag Gr I MCGIX Large Growth 3.21 0.77 -21.08 -4.84 2,125.4     92
ABN AMRO Equity Plus I IOEPX Large Blend 3.26 0.53 -17.57 -2.67 49.8         97
MassMutual Prem Core Gr S DLBRX Large Growth 3.30 0.75 -19.70 -4.28 80.8         93
AmCent Inc & Growth Inst AMGIX Large Value 3.57 0.49 18.67 2.29 359.8        98
Smith Barney Apprec Y SAPYX Large Blend 3.66 0.59 7.97 1.15 641.5        97
Pioneer Y PYODX Large Blend 3.79 0.61 3.23 0.44 155.5        97
Morgan Stan Ins Eq MPEQX Large Blend 3.86 0.62 1.42 0.17 207.7        97
GE U.S. Equity Y GEEDX Large Blend 3.89 0.53 -7.17 -0.94 340.9        98
BlackRock Lg Cap Val Is PNVEX Large Value 4.02 0.79 0.81 0.11 117.8        95
Thrivent Lg Cap Stock I IILGX Large Blend 4.21 0.57 -19.97 -2.54 121.4        98
Evergreen Strat Val Inst ESSIX Large Value 4.36 0.78 5.08 0.82 724.8        96
MFS Mass Inv Trust I MITIX Large Blend 4.37 0.59 -8.05 -1.05 121.8        98
GE Instl US Equity Svc GUSSX Large Blend 4.61 0.62 -7.41 -0.97 26.1         98
Phoenix-Kayne Ris Div X PKLFX Large Blend 4.61 1.19 -9.37 -2.38 94.3         90
Enterprise Growth Y ENGYX Large Growth 4.66 1.10 -22.71 -5.21 45.0         92
Nations LgCp Enhan Prim A NMIMX Large Blend 4.98 0.50 4.55 0.37 315.2        99
SB Growth & Inc Y SGTYX Large Blend 5.01 0.67 -0.93 -0.16 202.3        98
JP Morgan Tax Aw US Eq I JTUIX Large Blend 5.25 0.70 -15.09 -1.93 128.3        98
Strong Gr & Inc Instl SGNIX Large Blend 5.25 0.70 -6.29 -0.83 37.0         98
Goldman Sachs Cap Gr Ins GSPIX Large Growth 5.60 0.99 -15.98 -2.75 308.5        96
Hartford Stock Y HASYX Large Blend 5.60 0.88 -24.12 -3.65 91.5         97
Perform Lg Cap Eq Instl PFEQX Large Blend 5.71 1.01 -11.38 -1.97 66.5         96
UBS U.S. Allocation Y PWTYX Large Blend 5.85 0.58 0.39 -0.01 128.4        99
Goldman Sachs Str Gr I GSTIX Large Growth 5.89 1.04 -27.60 -4.72 176.6        96
HSBC Investor Gr&Inc Y HSGYX Large Blend 5.97 0.79 -22.21 -2.82 205.2        98
MFS Union Stand Equity I MUSEX Large Blend 6.07 0.95 5.03 0.71 33.0         97
BBH Tax-Efficient Eq N BBTEX Large Blend 6.21 1.20 -21.43 -4.04 50.2         95
PIMCO StocksPlus Instl PSTKX Large Blend 6.62 0.65 12.43 1.09 1,003.2     99
Enterprise Grwth & Inc Y ENCEX Large Blend 6.74 1.05 -9.41 -1.45 20.6         97
BNY Hamilton LgCap Gr Is BNLIX Large Blend 6.85 0.90 -32.29 -4.08 327.6        98
One Group Divr Eq I OGVFX Large Blend 7.09 0.93 -21.41 -2.72 1,653.3     98
Lazard Equity Instl LZEQX Large Value 7.49 0.98 16.03 1.96 117.0        98
JP Morgan Tax Aw U.S. Eq JPTAX Large Blend 8.70 0.84 -22.28 -2.08 939.8        99
PIMCO StocksPlus Admin PPLAX Large Blend 9.36 0.90 8.93 0.77 477.4        99
Mean 5.14 0.77 -7.71 -1.34 334.2        96.86
Note: Expense Ratios, Alphas, and R
2 are given in percent (%)
Source: Morningstar. All data covers the 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004 
except for expense ratios, which are the reported numbers as of the end of 2004
Expense Ratio Alpha
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Table 3. Individual Large-Cap Mutual Funds with the Ten Lowest Active Expense Ratios
Net
Ticker Morningstar Active Overall Active Overall Assets in
Fund Name Symbol Category CA CP α A α P $ million
State St Exchange STSEX Large Blend 2.08 0.59 -5.89 -1.41 299.4         93
Hartford Stock HLS IA HSTAX Large Blend 2.25 0.49 -22.45 -3.51 5,666.4      97
Parnassus Equity Inc PRBLX Large Blend 2.54 0.95 11.25 3.55 778.1         81
Fidelity Exchange FDLEX Large Blend 2.65 0.64 10.97 1.90 238.7         95
Van Kampen Exchange ACEHXLarge Blend 2.69 0.78 -14.18 -3.53 63.6           91
Fidelity Equity-Inc II FEQTX Large Value 2.89 0.64 21.47 3.49 12,915.4    96
Fidelity Growth & Income FGRIX Large Blend 2.91 0.69 -3.93 -0.88 32,106.1    95
TIAA-CREF Growth & Inc TIGIX Large Blend 2.92 0.43 -18.69 -1.87 523.9         99
Fidelity Discovery Fund FDSVX Large Blend 2.94 0.84 2.16 0.38 551.9         91
Fidelity Adv Div Gr I FDGIX Large Blend 2.96 0.74 -10.79 -2.32 895.9         94
Mean 2.68 0.68 -3.01 -0.42 5,403.9      93.20
Note: Expense Ratios, Alphas, and R
2 are given in percent (%)
Source: Morningstar. All data covers the 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004 











Table 4. Individual Large-Cap Mutual Funds with the Ten Highest Active Expense Ratios
Net
Ticker Morningstar Active Overall Active Overall Assets in
Fund Name Symbol Category CA CP α A α P $ million
ING Disc LargeCap C NEICX Large Blend 22.63 2.23 -16.17 -1.64 417.8         99
Frank Russell Tax LgCp C RTLCX Large Blend 19.45 1.94 -19.34 -1.93 120.3         99
Fidelity Adv Gr Opp C FACGX Large Blend 17.26 1.74 -17.59 -1.77 2,125.4      99
UBS U.S. Allocation C KPAAX Large Blend 16.50 1.67 -10.03 -1.08 49.8           99
SunAmerica Tax Mgd Eq CTXMTX Large Blend 15.54 2.10 -29.38 -3.83 80.8           98
PIMCO StocksPlus C PSPCX Large Blend 15.18 1.55 3.98 0.20 359.8         99
Hancock Sov Investors C SOVCX Large Blend 14.26 1.94 -23.94 -3.15 641.5         98
Principal Ptr Lg BlI J PPXJX Large Blend 13.98 1.44 -23.17 -2.28 155.5         99
Dreyfus Prem Lrg Co StkC DLCCX Large Blend 13.94 1.90 -24.90 -3.27 207.7         98
T. Rowe Price Cap Opport PRCOX Large Blend 13.65 1.41 8.69 0.63 340.9         99
Mean 16.24 1.79 -15.19 -1.81 450.0         98.70
Note: Expense Ratios, Alphas, and R
2 are given in percent (%)
Source: Morningstar. All data covers the 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004 
except for expense ratios, which are the reported numbers as of the end of 2004
R
2







Table 5. Individual Large-Cap Mutual Funds with the Most Assets Under Management
Net
Ticker Morningstar Assets in Active Overall Active Overall
Fund Name Symbol Category $ million CA CP α Α α P
Fidelity Magellan FMAGX Large Blend 63,295.8 5.87 0.70 -27.45 -2.67 99
Fidelity Growth & Income FGRIX Large Blend 32,106.1 2.91 0.69 -3.93 -0.88 95
Fidelity Dividend Growth FDGFX Large Blend 19,422.3 3.70 0.89 -10.34 -2.23 94
Fidelity Equity-Inc II FEQTX Large Value 12,915.4 2.89 0.64 21.47 3.49 96
Fidelity FFIDX Large Blend 10,812.2 3.46 0.59 -8.74 -1.25 98
Hartford Stock HLS IA HSTAX Large Blend 5,666.4    2.25 0.49 -22.45 -3.51 97
Dreyfus Appreciation DGAGX Large Blend 4,435.7    3.44 0.96 -5.61 -1.48 91
AmCent Inc & Growth Inv BIGRX Large Value 3,972.5    4.26 0.69 17.98 2.09 98
Scudder Growth & IncAARP ACDGX Large Blend 2,730.4    5.14 0.80 -8.82 -1.26 98
Scudder Growth & Inc S SCDGX Large Blend 2,374.2    5.94 0.90 -9.22 -1.31 98
Mean 15,773.1 3.99 0.74 -5.71 -0.90 96.40
Note: Expense Ratios, Alphas, and R
2 are given in percent (%)
Source: Morningstar. All data covers the 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004 
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Active expense ratios are even lower when the universe of big mutual funds is expanded beyond 
large-cap equity funds. Table 6 provides the numbers for the fifteen biggest funds for which it is 
possible to own an index fund that tracks Morningstar’s best-fit index for the mutual fund. The 
expense ratios for these index funds, which appear in the column labeled “Index Cost” and range 
from 0.15% to 0.35%, were used to compute the active expense ratio and active alpha for each 
fund. The mean active expense ratio for these funds is 3.32%. The three Vanguard funds are 
notable for outperforming their benchmarks while sporting an active expense ratio that is more 
than competitive with hedge funds. The biggest funds also provided investors, on average, with 
marginally positive overall and active alphas for the sample period. 
 
While most mutual funds have an obvious benchmark index that provides a low-cost alternative 
for their passive component (even if it is not one tracked by Morningstar), some still do not. This 
situation is changing, however, as the breadth and number of index funds (including exchange 
traded funds) grows rapidly. Some funds, however, fall between benchmarks. The next section 
looks at how the model developed above can be extended to deal with this and other problems. 
 
 
Extensions to the Model 
 
The formulas for the active expense ratio and active alpha can be easily computed and naturally 
interpreted; however, for certain applications more precise measures may be desired. The main 
source of error in the above analysis lies in the measurement of R
2. The imprecision caused by 
rounding of R
2 by Morningstar and other services (which can be rectified by rerunning the 
regression using raw returns data) is of secondary concern relative to larger errors that can result 
from the inappropriate benchmark choice and the misattribution of  “noise” or other sources of 
inefficient investment choice to active management. 
 
There are two fundamental ways in which the estimate of R
2 can be improved. First, the universe 
of benchmarks can be expanded to cover as much of the investment landscape as possible 
without concern for whether certain benchmarks overlap. Second, rather than limit funds to a 
single benchmark at a time, regressions of returns against multiple benchmarks (as is done for 
Sharpe’s style analysis) could be run and the adjusted R
2 could be used as the measure of the 
variance attributable to the passive part. Then, for example, the passive alternative to a large-cap 
fund with a propensity to invest in semiconductor companies would be a statistically determined 
combination of the S&P 500 and a semiconductor index. 
 
The cost of the passive alternative can then be computed as a weighted average of the cost of the 
index funds that comprise its passive part. These weights can be taken directly from a returns 
regression or, when costs vary significantly from index to index, be generated by a model that 
minimizes the cost of indexing subject to various constraints and tradeoffs. Of course, these costs 
themselves have a subjective element to them given that all the funds that mirror a given index 
do not have the same fees and the one with the lowest fee may not always represent a practical 
choice; however, the values of the active expense ratio and active alpha are usually insensitive to 
reasonable variations in the expense ratio for the passive component of the portfolio. Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  21 
  
 
The use of multiple benchmarks, even using an adjusted value of R
2 in an effort to mitigate any 
“data snooping” effects, can give the appearance of failing to credit the fund manager with active 
management simply because a combination of index funds happen to approximate his returns 
over an extended period of time. Although the manager may intend to provide his investors with 
100% active management, his intentions are not the issue when his actions can be replicated at a 
significantly lower cost via indexing. 
 
Indeed, it may be more important to make adjustments in the other direction so as not to 
improperly credit the manager for being active when he was simply insufficiently diligent to 
hedge out unintended bets in his portfolio. Since the noise of inadequate diversification is more 
pronounced in portfolios with concentrated holdings, one can make adjustments to the active 
weight in the portfolio that will, in turn, affect the values of the active expense ratio and active 
alpha. The downside of making such an adjustment is that doing so requires some knowledge of 
the fund’s portfolio. In this case, at least, the timeliness of that knowledge is not likely to be 
critical. 
 
The role that noise plays in the allocation of weight between passive and active management 
may be secondary, however, to that played by the assumption that the synthetic passive and 
active components of the portfolio have the same variance. This assumption provides a way to 
dodge the question of what the true cost of replicating the fund manager’s action that helps to 
generate a convenient and seemingly natural formula in the process. Some forms of adjustment 
to the hypothesis—for example, that the active component has a variance that is 10% more or 
10% less than the passive component—can be made without sacrificing much in the way of ease 
of computation; however, such an adjustment should be justified on empirical grounds. 
 
More complex adjustments to the allocation mechanism could take into account not only R
2, but 
also the portfolio’s holdings throughout the evaluation period. While such information is rarely 
available for publicly traded funds, it can be useful for internal assessments, especially in 
situations where portfolios are parceled out among managers. It can also be useful when one is 
looking to evaluate the performance of an index that is expensive to track directly but has one or 
more indexes that can be used to approximate it at a lower expense. 
 
Beyond its obvious convenience as a cost measure, the active expense ratio might have 
predictive value. Using only the standard expense ratio, there remains disagreement as to the role 
of fund expenses in determining a fund’s overall performance. Carhart (1997) and Bogle (1999) 
take the position that expenses are the prime determinant of a fund’s performance—with a higher 
expense ratio leading directly to lower performance—while Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
(1993) and Wermers (2000) provide evidence that market timing and stock picking are more 
important than expenses in determined fund performance. 
 
Using cost and performance measures that separate out the implicit share of funds being actively 
managed could help resolve the link between expenses and performance. It is not unreasonable 
to believe that a manager who is able to provide genuinely inexpensive active management might Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds  22 
  
perform better than one who gives only the appearance of a low expense ratio through closet 
indexing. The results obtained in this preliminary study hint at the possibility that both the active 
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